LibraryData and agents2016Design paperCorpus record
Town Crier: an authenticated data feed from HTTPS using trusted hardware
Town Crier. Fan Zhang, Ethan Cecchetti, Kyle Croman, Ari Juels and Elaine Shi.
Town Crier proposes a bridge from an HTTPS website to a contract by running the TLS client inside trusted hardware and attesting the bytes.
A reading of the project's public design document. Not a copy, not a benchmark, and not an offer.
Town Crier proposes a bridge from an HTTPS website to a contract by running the TLS client inside trusted hardware and attesting the bytes.
- Evidence
- Primary paper
- Re-measured
- No
- Assumptions
- 3
- Records linked
- 3
01 Claim ledger
What the paper is allowed to say
Each row is a sentence already in the study. The status is the same on every row: a model claim, not a live measurement.
Claim 01 · Paper model
The defect
An attestation of a webpage is only as honest as the hardware and only as fresh as the fetch. It is not a decentralised oracle by itself.
Claim 02 · Paper model
The proposal
Town Crier proposes a bridge from an HTTPS website to a contract by running the TLS client inside trusted hardware and attesting the bytes.
Claim 03 · Paper model
The mechanism
The enclave opens a TLS session, checks the certificate, and signs the response for the contract.
Claim 04 · Paper model
The bound
This is a 2016 research system. It is not a statement that any current oracle runs this code.
02 Three cuts
Observation, model, falsifier
A desk does not stop at the summary. Each claim is cut three ways, using only this study's own assumptions and checks. Nothing here is a new figure.
01 The defect
Observation
What the study says
An attestation of a webpage is only as honest as the hardware and only as fresh as the fetch. It is not a decentralised oracle by itself.
Model
What has to hold
You are reading ePrint 2016/168. A modern oracle product is not this system unless it says it is.
Falsifier
What would retire it
What does the contract verify: an enclave attestation, or the TLS bytes themselves?
02 The proposal
Observation
What the study says
Town Crier proposes a bridge from an HTTPS website to a contract by running the TLS client inside trusted hardware and attesting the bytes.
Model
What has to hold
The document is the one at the source URL. A marketing page with the same brand is not this text.
Falsifier
What would retire it
What does the contract verify: an enclave attestation, or the TLS bytes themselves?
03 The mechanism
Observation
What the study says
The enclave opens a TLS session, checks the certificate, and signs the response for the contract.
Model
What has to hold
No price, supply, yield, or adoption figure is added by this desk.
Falsifier
What would retire it
What does the contract verify: an enclave attestation, or the TLS bytes themselves?
04 The bound
Observation
What the study says
This is a 2016 research system. It is not a statement that any current oracle runs this code.
Model
What has to hold
You are reading ePrint 2016/168. A modern oracle product is not this system unless it says it is.
Falsifier
What would retire it
What does the contract verify: an enclave attestation, or the TLS bytes themselves?
03 Sequence
One action, as an operating tape
- 01The enclave opens a TLS session, checks the certificate, and signs the response for the contract.
- 02The contract learns what the enclave says the site returned. It does not learn that the site was right.
- 03A compromised enclave, or a site that returns different answers to different callers, breaks the intended authenticity.
04 Load-bearing
The argument, and where a pitch drops it
What the name has to mean
The cut
Town Crier proposes a bridge from an HTTPS website to a contract by running the TLS client inside trusted hardware and attesting the bytes.
Why it carries weight
If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.
Where it is dropped
It does not remove trust in the website.
What actually moves
The cut
The contract learns what the enclave says the site returned. It does not learn that the site was right.
Why it carries weight
If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.
Where it is dropped
A later client, parameter or reward formula is a different object from this paragraph.
What a later deployment may change
The cut
A compromised enclave, or a site that returns different answers to different callers, breaks the intended authenticity.
Why it carries weight
If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.
Where it is dropped
DECO is a later, different approach that tries to avoid the hardware assumption.
05 Register
What has to be true
Model · Not re-measured
You are reading ePrint 2016/168. A modern oracle product is not this system unless it says it is.
Model · Not re-measured
The document is the one at the source URL. A marketing page with the same brand is not this text.
Model · Not re-measured
No price, supply, yield, or adoption figure is added by this desk.
06 Divergence
What happened after the paper
DECO is a later, different approach that tries to avoid the hardware assumption.
A later client, parameter set, or reward formula is a different object. Cite this paper for the mechanism. Cite a primary release for the network. This desk has not re-run the proof.
07 Pre-mortem
What to check before you use the idea
- 0 of 3 marked on this browser. A mark is a reading note, not a pass, a rating, or a recommendation.
08 Anatomy
The paper, in the order a builder needs
The problem it names
An attestation of a webpage is only as honest as the hardware and only as fresh as the fetch. It is not a decentralised oracle by itself.
What the design proposes
- The enclave opens a TLS session, checks the certificate, and signs the response for the contract.
- The contract learns what the enclave says the site returned. It does not learn that the site was right.
- A compromised enclave, or a site that returns different answers to different callers, breaks the intended authenticity.
How the mechanism is specified
- The enclave opens a TLS session, checks the certificate, and signs the response for the contract.
- The contract learns what the enclave says the site returned. It does not learn that the site was right.
- A compromised enclave, or a site that returns different answers to different callers, breaks the intended authenticity.
What this page does not treat as proven
Why the desk still reads it
Town Crier proposes a bridge from an HTTPS website to a contract by running the TLS client inside trusted hardware and attesting the bytes.
09 Lexicon
Terms, opened into the record
- Attested HTTPS
- A hardware signature over a TLS response. It is not the TLS session itself.
- Enclave
- The trusted-hardware boundary the paper assumes.
10 Repository
Every linked record on this page
Underlined words open a page that already exists: a concept, a protocol profile, a failure record, or another paper. If a word is not underlined, this desk does not have a record for it.
Papers
This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.
Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.