LibraryData and agents2019Design paperCorpus record
DECO: proving statements about TLS data without a trusted hardware box
DECO. Fan Zhang, Deepak Maram, Harjasleen Malvai, Steven Goldfeder and Ari Juels.
DECO proposes that a user prove a fact about a TLS session with a website, to a verifier, without putting the session inside trusted hardware.
A reading of the project's public design document. Not a copy, not a benchmark, and not an offer.
DECO proposes that a user prove a fact about a TLS session with a website, to a verifier, without putting the session inside trusted hardware.
- Evidence
- Primary paper
- Re-measured
- No
- Assumptions
- 3
- Records linked
- 2
01 Claim ledger
What the paper is allowed to say
Each row is a sentence already in the study. The status is the same on every row: a model claim, not a live measurement.
Claim 01 · Paper model
The defect
A proof about a TLS transcript proves what the server sent in that session. It does not prove the server told the truth, and it does not by itself hide the query from the server.
Claim 02 · Paper model
The proposal
DECO proposes that a user prove a fact about a TLS session with a website, to a verifier, without putting the session inside trusted hardware.
Claim 03 · Paper model
The mechanism
The prover and the verifier jointly participate so the prover cannot splice a fake response, under the paper's construction.
Claim 04 · Paper model
The bound
This is a paper. It is not a claim that Chainlink or any product has deployed it unchanged.
02 Three cuts
Observation, model, falsifier
A desk does not stop at the summary. Each claim is cut three ways, using only this study's own assumptions and checks. Nothing here is a new figure.
01 The defect
Observation
What the study says
A proof about a TLS transcript proves what the server sent in that session. It does not prove the server told the truth, and it does not by itself hide the query from the server.
Model
What has to hold
You are reading the DECO paper. A product integration is a later document.
Falsifier
What would retire it
What does the origin server learn from the session?
02 The proposal
Observation
What the study says
DECO proposes that a user prove a fact about a TLS session with a website, to a verifier, without putting the session inside trusted hardware.
Model
What has to hold
The document is the one at the source URL. A marketing page with the same brand is not this text.
Falsifier
What would retire it
What statement about the TLS data is proved?
03 The mechanism
Observation
What the study says
The prover and the verifier jointly participate so the prover cannot splice a fake response, under the paper's construction.
Model
What has to hold
You are reading the DECO paper. A product integration is a later document.
Falsifier
What would retire it
Who plays the verifier?
04 The bound
Observation
What the study says
This is a paper. It is not a claim that Chainlink or any product has deployed it unchanged.
Model
What has to hold
You are reading the DECO paper. A product integration is a later document.
Falsifier
What would retire it
What statement about the TLS data is proved?
03 Sequence
One action, as an operating tape
- 01The prover and the verifier jointly participate so the prover cannot splice a fake response, under the paper's construction.
- 02The statement proved can be a slice of the response, not the whole page. The slice is the application.
- 03The TLS endpoint still sees a connection. Privacy against the server is a different goal from authenticity to the verifier.
04 Load-bearing
The argument, and where a pitch drops it
What the name has to mean
The cut
DECO proposes that a user prove a fact about a TLS session with a website, to a verifier, without putting the session inside trusted hardware.
Why it carries weight
If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.
Where it is dropped
Town Crier's hardware assumption is what this paper is trying to avoid. Do not describe them as the same design.
What actually moves
The cut
The statement proved can be a slice of the response, not the whole page. The slice is the application.
Why it carries weight
If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.
Where it is dropped
A later client, parameter or reward formula is a different object from this paragraph.
What a later deployment may change
The cut
The TLS endpoint still sees a connection. Privacy against the server is a different goal from authenticity to the verifier.
Why it carries weight
If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.
Where it is dropped
A later client, parameter or reward formula is a different object from this paragraph.
05 Register
What has to be true
Model · Not re-measured
You are reading the DECO paper. A product integration is a later document.
Model · Not re-measured
The document is the one at the source URL. A marketing page with the same brand is not this text.
Model · Not re-measured
No price, supply, yield, or adoption figure is added by this desk.
06 Divergence
What happened after the paper
Town Crier's hardware assumption is what this paper is trying to avoid. Do not describe them as the same design.
A later client, parameter set, or reward formula is a different object. Cite this paper for the mechanism. Cite a primary release for the network. This desk has not re-run the proof.
07 Pre-mortem
What to check before you use the idea
- 0 of 3 marked on this browser. A mark is a reading note, not a pass, a rating, or a recommendation.
08 Anatomy
The paper, in the order a builder needs
The problem it names
A proof about a TLS transcript proves what the server sent in that session. It does not prove the server told the truth, and it does not by itself hide the query from the server.
What the design proposes
- The prover and the verifier jointly participate so the prover cannot splice a fake response, under the paper's construction.
- The statement proved can be a slice of the response, not the whole page. The slice is the application.
- The TLS endpoint still sees a connection. Privacy against the server is a different goal from authenticity to the verifier.
How the mechanism is specified
- The prover and the verifier jointly participate so the prover cannot splice a fake response, under the paper's construction.
- The statement proved can be a slice of the response, not the whole page. The slice is the application.
- The TLS endpoint still sees a connection. Privacy against the server is a different goal from authenticity to the verifier.
What this page does not treat as proven
- This is a paper. It is not a claim that Chainlink or any product has deployed it unchanged.
- It does not state a performance number.
- Town Crier's hardware assumption is what this paper is trying to avoid. Do not describe them as the same design.
Why the desk still reads it
DECO proposes that a user prove a fact about a TLS session with a website, to a verifier, without putting the session inside trusted hardware.
09 Lexicon
Terms, opened into the record
- TLS proof
- A proof about bytes from a TLS session. It is not a proof the bytes are true.
- Verifier
- The party who checks the proof. In a contract setting this has to be named.
10 Repository
Every linked record on this page
Underlined words open a page that already exists: a concept, a protocol profile, a failure record, or another paper. If a word is not underlined, this desk does not have a record for it.
Protocols
Papers
This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.
Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.