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LibraryConsensus2015Design paperCorpus record

Demystifying Incentives in the Consensus Computer

Verifier's dilemma. Loi Luu, Jason Teutsch, Raghav Kulkarni and Prateek Saxena.

If checking a block is expensive and the chance it is invalid is small, the equilibrium is not to check. The paper names that gap the verifier's dilemma.

A reading of the public document. Not a copy of it, and not a claim about a later network that reused the name.

A chain that makes block validation arbitrarily expensive has to say who is paid to do it.
Evidence
Primary paper
Re-measured
No
Assumptions
3
Records linked
4

Code

Source, repository, and what is actually hosted

  • ePrint 2015/702https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/702
  • The source URL is not a GitHub repository. No code remote is invented.
  • Full text is not mirrored. Public availability is not a licence to copy the file onto this site.
  • Add to a reading list

01 Claim ledger

What the paper is allowed to say

Each row is a sentence already in the study. The status is the same on every row: a model claim, not a live measurement.

  1. Claim 01 · Paper model

    The defect

    A rational miner may skip verifying a heavy block and mine on top of it anyway, because verification delays the next puzzle.

  2. Claim 02 · Paper model

    The rule

    If checking a block is expensive and the chance it is invalid is small, the equilibrium is not to check. The paper names that gap the verifier's dilemma.

  3. Claim 03 · Paper model

    How it is put together

    Mining reward and verification cost are different clocks. An invalid block that nobody checks can still be extended. The dilemma is about incentives, not about a broken signature scheme.

  4. Claim 04 · Paper model

    Where the claim stops

    The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.

02 Three cuts

Observation, model, falsifier

A desk does not stop at the summary. Each claim is cut three ways, using only this study's own assumptions and checks. Nothing here is a new figure.

  1. 01 The defect

    Observation

    What the study says

    A rational miner may skip verifying a heavy block and mine on top of it anyway, because verification delays the next puzzle.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What does it cost to check a block before mining on it?

  2. 02 The rule

    Observation

    What the study says

    If checking a block is expensive and the chance it is invalid is small, the equilibrium is not to check. The paper names that gap the verifier's dilemma.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What does it cost to check a block before mining on it?

  3. 03 How it is put together

    Observation

    What the study says

    Mining reward and verification cost are different clocks. An invalid block that nobody checks can still be extended. The dilemma is about incentives, not about a broken signature scheme.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What does it cost to check a block before mining on it?

  4. 04 Where the claim stops

    Observation

    What the study says

    The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What does it cost to check a block before mining on it?

03 Sequence

One action, as an operating tape

  1. 01A miner receives a block.
  2. 02They estimate the cost of executing it against the chance it is invalid.
  3. 03If they mine immediately, their block is wasted only when the parent was bad and someone else noticed.
  4. 04What does it cost to check a block before mining on it?

04 Load-bearing

The argument, and where a pitch drops it

  1. Why it is still on the desk

    The cut

    A chain that makes block validation arbitrarily expensive has to say who is paid to do it.

    Why it carries weight

    If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.

    Where it is dropped

    A later client, parameter or reward formula is a different object from this paragraph.

  2. After the text

    The cut

    Stateless clients, fraud proofs and danksharding all answer a version of this dilemma. The 2015 paper is the question.

    Why it carries weight

    If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.

    Where it is dropped

    The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.

05 Register

What has to be true

  • Model · Not re-measured

    The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.

  • Model · Not re-measured

    It does not say miners never verify.

  • Cryptography · Not re-measured

    It is not a proof that proof of work has failed.

06 Divergence

What happened after the paper

Stateless clients, fraud proofs and danksharding all answer a version of this dilemma. The 2015 paper is the question.

A later client, parameter set, or reward formula is a different object. Cite this paper for the mechanism. Cite a primary release for the network. This desk has not re-run the proof.

07 Pre-mortem

What to check before you use the idea

  4. 0 of 3 marked on this browser. A mark is a reading note, not a pass, a rating, or a recommendation.

08 Anatomy

The paper, in the order a builder needs

The problem it names

A rational miner may skip verifying a heavy block and mine on top of it anyway, because verification delays the next puzzle.

What the design proposes

  • Mining reward and verification cost are different clocks.
  • An invalid block that nobody checks can still be extended.
  • The dilemma is about incentives, not about a broken signature scheme.

How the mechanism is specified

  • A miner receives a block.
  • They estimate the cost of executing it against the chance it is invalid.
  • If they mine immediately, their block is wasted only when the parent was bad and someone else noticed.

What this page does not treat as proven

  • The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.
  • It does not say miners never verify.
  • It is not a proof that proof of work has failed.

Why the desk still reads it

A chain that makes block validation arbitrarily expensive has to say who is paid to do it.

09 Lexicon

Terms, opened into the record

Verifier's dilemma
The incentive to skip a check that everyone else might also skip.
Consensus computer
A chain that agrees on the result of a program, not only on a list of payments.

10 Repository

Every linked record on this page

Underlined words open a page that already exists: a concept, a protocol profile, a failure record, or another paper. If a word is not underlined, this desk does not have a record for it.

Protocols

This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.

Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.