LibraryConsensus2016Design paperCorpus record
Stubborn Mining: Generalizing Selfish Mining and Combining with an Eclipse Attack
Stubborn mining. Kartik Nayak, Srijan Kumar, Andrew Miller and Elaine Shi.
The paper generalises the withholding strategies and shows they compose with an eclipse attack that starves a node of honest blocks.
A reading of the public paper. Not a copy, not a benchmark, and not a claim about any later network.
A mining analysis that only models the 2014 selfish policy is incomplete about the strategies this paper adds.
The five-minute read
The defect
Selfish mining is one withholding policy. A miner can do better, in the paper's model, by sometimes publishing and sometimes hiding, and by eclipsing the victim.
The proposal
The paper generalises the withholding strategies and shows they compose with an eclipse attack that starves a node of honest blocks.
The strategy space is larger than the original selfish-mining policy.
Eclipse is a network attack. Mining is a consensus attack. Together they change the revenue.
The bound
The paper does not say a named pool is attacking today.
One action, walked through
- Withhold a block.
- Choose whether to publish based on the public tip, not only on the original selfish rule.
- If the victim is eclipsed, the attacker feeds the view that makes the withholding pay.
- Does the attack assume an eclipsed victim?
The argument, unpacked
What the paper is for
A mining analysis that only models the 2014 selfish policy is incomplete about the strategies this paper adds.
What happened after
Relay networks and peer-manager fixes are the practical responses. They do not repeal the model.
What has to be true
- The paper does not say a named pool is attacking today.
- Parameters of propagation decide the profit.
- It is not an instruction for attacking a network.
What happened after the paper
Relay networks and peer-manager fixes are the practical responses. They do not repeal the model.
What to check before you use the idea
- Which withholding rule is being modelled?
- Does the attack assume an eclipsed victim?
- What propagation delay makes it unprofitable?
Terms
- Stubborn mining
- A family of withholding policies, not a single threshold.
- Eclipse
- Isolating a node so it sees only the attacker's blocks and transactions.
The problem the paper names
Selfish mining is one withholding policy. A miner can do better, in the paper's model, by sometimes publishing and sometimes hiding, and by eclipsing the victim.
What the design proposes
- The strategy space is larger than the original selfish-mining policy.
- Eclipse is a network attack. Mining is a consensus attack. Together they change the revenue.
- The result is model-dependent.
How the mechanism is specified
- Withhold a block.
- Choose whether to publish based on the public tip, not only on the original selfish rule.
- If the victim is eclipsed, the attacker feeds the view that makes the withholding pay.
What this page does not treat as proven
- The paper does not say a named pool is attacking today.
- Parameters of propagation decide the profit.
- It is not an instruction for attacking a network.
Why a venture studio still reads it
A mining analysis that only models the 2014 selfish policy is incomplete about the strategies this paper adds.
This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.
Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.