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LibraryData and agents2024Design paperCorpus record

Set Code for EOAs

EIP-7702. Vitalik Buterin, Sam Wilson, Ansgar Dietrichs and Matt Garnett.

A transaction can temporarily, for the transaction's authority, delegate an externally owned account's code to a contract. The key still signs. The code that runs can batch, sponsor, or limit what the key may do.

A reading of the public document. Not a copy of it, and not a claim about a later network that reused the name.

A wallet that asks a user to delegate code should show the code's address and how to clear it.
Evidence
Primary paper
Re-measured
No
Assumptions
3
Records linked
3

Code

Source, repository, and what is actually hosted

  • EIP-7702https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702
  • The source URL is not a GitHub repository. No code remote is invented.
  • Full text is not mirrored. Public availability is not a licence to copy the file onto this site.
  • Add to a reading list

01 Claim ledger

What the paper is allowed to say

Each row is a sentence already in the study. The status is the same on every row: a model claim, not a live measurement.

  1. Claim 01 · Paper model

    The defect

    Account abstraction that requires a new contract account leaves every existing key behind.

  2. Claim 02 · Paper model

    The rule

    A transaction can temporarily, for the transaction's authority, delegate an externally owned account's code to a contract. The key still signs. The code that runs can batch, sponsor, or limit what the key may do.

  3. Claim 03 · Paper model

    How it is put together

    The signer is still the key. The code is delegated, not a new permanent account, in the form the EIP specifies. Revocation is part of the design. A delegation that cannot be removed is a bug.

  4. Claim 04 · Paper model

    Where the claim stops

    The EIP's security depends on the code being delegated. A malicious delegation empties the account.

02 Three cuts

Observation, model, falsifier

A desk does not stop at the summary. Each claim is cut three ways, using only this study's own assumptions and checks. Nothing here is a new figure.

  1. 01 The defect

    Observation

    What the study says

    Account abstraction that requires a new contract account leaves every existing key behind.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The EIP's security depends on the code being delegated. A malicious delegation empties the account.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What address is the account delegating to?

  2. 02 The rule

    Observation

    What the study says

    A transaction can temporarily, for the transaction's authority, delegate an externally owned account's code to a contract. The key still signs. The code that runs can batch, sponsor, or limit what the key may do.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The EIP's security depends on the code being delegated. A malicious delegation empties the account.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What address is the account delegating to?

  3. 03 How it is put together

    Observation

    What the study says

    The signer is still the key. The code is delegated, not a new permanent account, in the form the EIP specifies. Revocation is part of the design. A delegation that cannot be removed is a bug.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The EIP's security depends on the code being delegated. A malicious delegation empties the account.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What address is the account delegating to?

  4. 04 Where the claim stops

    Observation

    What the study says

    The EIP's security depends on the code being delegated. A malicious delegation empties the account.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The EIP's security depends on the code being delegated. A malicious delegation empties the account.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What address is the account delegating to?

03 Sequence

One action, as an operating tape

  1. 01The key signs an authorisation that names the code.
  2. 02The transaction sets that delegation.
  3. 03Calls then execute the delegated code under that account.
  4. 04What address is the account delegating to?

04 Load-bearing

The argument, and where a pitch drops it

  1. Why it is still on the desk

    The cut

    A wallet that asks a user to delegate code should show the code's address and how to clear it.

    Why it carries weight

    If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.

    Where it is dropped

    A later client, parameter or reward formula is a different object from this paragraph.

  2. After the text

    The cut

    Ethereum shipped this with the Pectra upgrade. The EIP is the rule. A wallet's user interface is not.

    Why it carries weight

    If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.

    Where it is dropped

    A later client, parameter or reward formula is a different object from this paragraph.

05 Register

What has to be true

  • Model · Not re-measured

    The EIP's security depends on the code being delegated. A malicious delegation empties the account.

  • Model · Not re-measured

    This is not 4337, though wallets may use both.

  • Model · Not re-measured

    A delegation is a capability. Treat it as one.

06 Divergence

What happened after the paper

Ethereum shipped this with the Pectra upgrade. The EIP is the rule. A wallet's user interface is not.

A later client, parameter set, or reward formula is a different object. Cite this paper for the mechanism. Cite a primary release for the network. This desk has not re-run the proof.

07 Pre-mortem

What to check before you use the idea

  4. 0 of 3 marked on this browser. A mark is a reading note, not a pass, a rating, or a recommendation.

08 Anatomy

The paper, in the order a builder needs

The problem it names

Account abstraction that requires a new contract account leaves every existing key behind.

What the design proposes

  • The signer is still the key.
  • The code is delegated, not a new permanent account, in the form the EIP specifies.
  • Revocation is part of the design. A delegation that cannot be removed is a bug.

How the mechanism is specified

  • The key signs an authorisation that names the code.
  • The transaction sets that delegation.
  • Calls then execute the delegated code under that account.

What this page does not treat as proven

  • The EIP's security depends on the code being delegated. A malicious delegation empties the account.
  • This is not 4337, though wallets may use both.
  • A delegation is a capability. Treat it as one.

Why the desk still reads it

A wallet that asks a user to delegate code should show the code's address and how to clear it.

09 Lexicon

Terms, opened into the record

Delegation
A pointer from an externally owned account to code it will run.
Authorisation
The signature that permits that pointer.

10 Repository

Every linked record on this page

Underlined words open a page that already exists: a concept, a protocol profile, a failure record, or another paper. If a word is not underlined, this desk does not have a record for it.

Protocols

This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.

Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.