LibraryCredit and stable value2022Design paperCorpus record
Curve stablecoin design
crvUSD design. Michael Egorov.
A stablecoin lent against volatile collateral, where liquidation is a continuous trade into a special pool rather than a one-shot auction. The paper calls that pool LLAMMA. A peg keeper and a monetary-policy rate sit beside it. Simulations in the paper are not a promise about later losses.
The Curve stablecoin design liquidates continuously. Collateral sits in bands of an AMM called LLAMMA and is converted as an oracle price moves, instead of being sold in one auction. A peg keeper and a borrowing rate try to hold the stablecoin near its reference. The paper's simulation is not a loss guarantee.
- Evidence
- Primary paper
- Re-measured
- No
- Assumptions
- 4
- Records linked
- 10
Code
Source, repository, and what is actually hosted
- Curve Finance, 2022https://docs.curve.finance/pdf/whitepapers/whitepaper_curve_stablecoin.pdf
- The source URL is not a GitHub repository. No code remote is invented.
- Full text is not mirrored. Public availability is not a licence to copy the file onto this site.
- Add to a reading list
01 Claim ledger
What the paper is allowed to say
Each row is a sentence already in the study. The status is the same on every row: a model claim, not a live measurement.
Claim 01 · Paper model
Bands, not a cliff
A price move converts part of the collateral. A bounce can convert some of it back. That is the difference from a vault that auctions everything once a line is crossed.
Claim 02 · Paper model
The oracle is still required
LLAMMA reacts to an external price. It is not itself the oracle. A wrong oracle moves the bands wrongly, continuously.
Claim 03 · Paper model
The peg keeper is a trader
When the stablecoin leaves its peg against a reference coin, the design trades inventory to push it back. That inventory is finite.
Claim 04 · Paper model
The rate is a policy
Borrowing cost changes with the peg. The paper states the direction. It does not state a number you can treat as a market quote for all time.
02 Three cuts
Observation, model, falsifier
A desk does not stop at the summary. Each claim is cut three ways, using only this study's own assumptions and checks. Nothing here is a new figure.
01 Bands, not a cliff
Observation
What the study says
A price move converts part of the collateral. A bounce can convert some of it back. That is the difference from a vault that auctions everything once a line is crossed.
Model
What has to hold
The oracle updates inside the time the bands were built for. A gap through every band is the failure the design is trying to soften, not a case it cannot see.
02 The oracle is still required
Observation
What the study says
LLAMMA reacts to an external price. It is not itself the oracle. A wrong oracle moves the bands wrongly, continuously.
Model
What has to hold
The oracle updates inside the time the bands were built for. A gap through every band is the failure the design is trying to soften, not a case it cannot see.
03 The peg keeper is a trader
Observation
What the study says
When the stablecoin leaves its peg against a reference coin, the design trades inventory to push it back. That inventory is finite.
Model
What has to hold
Reference liquidity for the peg keeper exists. An empty reference pool cannot defend a peg.
Falsifier
What would retire it
What is left for the borrower after a dip and a recovery, in the design?
04 The rate is a policy
Observation
What the study says
Borrowing cost changes with the peg. The paper states the direction. It does not state a number you can treat as a market quote for all time.
Model
What has to hold
The stablecoin is not a claim on bank deposits. Nothing in the design adds that claim.
Falsifier
What would retire it
Is a simulation being quoted as a guarantee?
03 Sequence
One action, as an operating tape
- 01A borrower posts collateral and receives stablecoin, within the design's limits.
- 02Collateral is placed into LLAMMA bands around the oracle price.
- 03If the oracle price falls, bands trade collateral toward the stablecoin.
- 04If the oracle price recovers, bands can trade back, at a cost the paper discusses.
- 05If the stablecoin itself leaves its peg, the peg keeper and the rate are the other two levers.
04 Load-bearing
The argument, and where a pitch drops it
Smaller loss is not no loss
The cut
The PDF simulates historical ether prices and argues that a short, shallow dip destroys less collateral than a hard liquidation. A simulation inside a design note is not a promise about the next dip, and it is not a track record of a live system.
Why it carries weight
If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.
Where it is dropped
Soft liquidation can still lose value. The paper argues the loss is smaller in its simulation. It does not set that loss to zero.
Three mechanisms, not one
The cut
LLAMMA, the peg keeper and the rate do different jobs. A summary that says 'the AMM keeps the peg' has merged them and lost the oracle.
Why it carries weight
If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.
Where it is dropped
Oracle failure, parameter changes, and later governance are outside the theorems, because the paper is a design note rather than a formal proof.
05 Register
What has to be true
Model · Not re-measured
The oracle updates inside the time the bands were built for. A gap through every band is the failure the design is trying to soften, not a case it cannot see.
Model · Not re-measured
Reference liquidity for the peg keeper exists. An empty reference pool cannot defend a peg.
Model · Not re-measured
Parameters are those of the deployment. The PDF uses examples.
Model · Not re-measured
The stablecoin is not a claim on bank deposits. Nothing in the design adds that claim.
06 Divergence
What happened after the paper
crvUSD is the later system built from this note. Read the PDF for LLAMMA and the peg keeper. Read Maker and Liquity for the auction and the stability pool, which are different answers to the same liquidation question. Do not mix their loss stories.
A later client, parameter set, or reward formula is a different object. Cite this paper for the mechanism. Cite a primary release for the network. This desk has not re-run the proof.
07 Pre-mortem
What to check before you use the idea
- 0 of 4 marked on this browser. A mark is a reading note, not a pass, a rating, or a recommendation.
08 Anatomy
The paper, in the order a builder needs
The problem it names
A vault that liquidates all at once can sell into a hole and charge the borrower the whole gap. The design asks whether liquidation can be a band of liquidity that converts collateral to the stablecoin as the price falls, and converts back if the price rises.
What the design proposes
- LLAMMA: collateral sits in a range of AMM bands and is traded as an external price moves.
- A peg keeper trades the stablecoin against a reference coin when the price is off its peg.
- A rate policy changes the cost of borrowing as the peg moves. The paper states the direction of that response.
How the mechanism is specified
- The external price is an input. The design needs an oracle. The AMM does not replace that oracle. It uses it.
- A borrower who is 'liquidated' may still hold a mix of collateral and stablecoin, and may be deleveraged rather than closed. That is the point of the bands.
- The paper includes a historical simulation of ether. A simulation is an illustration inside the PDF, not a track record.
What this page does not treat as proven
- Soft liquidation can still lose value. The paper argues the loss is smaller in its simulation. It does not set that loss to zero.
- The stablecoin is a mechanism claim, not a claim on dollars in a bank.
- Oracle failure, parameter changes, and later governance are outside the theorems, because the paper is a design note rather than a formal proof.
09 Lexicon
Terms, opened into the record
- LLAMMA
- The lending-liquidating AMM: collateral is converted across price bands as an oracle moves, rather than in a single auction.
- Peg keeper
- A mechanism that trades the stablecoin against a reference asset when the market price leaves the peg.
10 Repository
Every linked record on this page
Underlined words open a page that already exists: a concept, a protocol profile, a failure record, or another paper. If a word is not underlined, this desk does not have a record for it.
This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.
Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.
