LibraryPrivacy2018Design paperCorpus record
Compact Multi-Signatures for Smaller Blockchains
Compact multi-signatures. Dan Boneh, Manu Drijvers and Gregory Neven.
The paper gives a BLS multi-signature that stays compact and blocks the rogue-key attack with a proof of possession of each key.
A reading of the public paper. Not a copy, not a benchmark, and not a claim about any later network.
If a chain aggregates BLS votes, ask where the proof of possession happens. If the answer is nowhere, this paper is the objection.
- Evidence
- Primary paper
- Re-measured
- No
- Assumptions
- 3
- Records linked
- 6
Code
Source, repository, and what is actually hosted
- ePrint 2018/483https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/483
- The source URL is not a GitHub repository. No code remote is invented.
- Full text is not mirrored. Public availability is not a licence to copy the file onto this site.
- Add to a reading list
01 Claim ledger
What the paper is allowed to say
Each row is a sentence already in the study. The status is the same on every row: a model claim, not a live measurement.
Claim 01 · Paper model
The defect
A naive multi-signature either lists every key and every signature, or it can be attacked by a rogue key that cancels someone else's public key.
Claim 02 · Paper model
The proposal
The paper gives a BLS multi-signature that stays compact and blocks the rogue-key attack with a proof of possession of each key.
Claim 03 · Paper model
Aggregation is not the same as a threshold scheme.
A proof of possession is the defence named here.
Claim 04 · Paper model
The bound
This is not MuSig and not FROST. The group is pairing-based.
02 Three cuts
Observation, model, falsifier
A desk does not stop at the summary. Each claim is cut three ways, using only this study's own assumptions and checks. Nothing here is a new figure.
01 The defect
Observation
What the study says
A naive multi-signature either lists every key and every signature, or it can be attacked by a rogue key that cancels someone else's public key.
Model
What has to hold
A missing proof of possession reopens the rogue-key attack.
02 The proposal
Observation
What the study says
The paper gives a BLS multi-signature that stays compact and blocks the rogue-key attack with a proof of possession of each key.
Model
What has to hold
A missing proof of possession reopens the rogue-key attack.
03 Aggregation is not the same as a threshold scheme.
Observation
What the study says
A proof of possession is the defence named here.
Model
What has to hold
A missing proof of possession reopens the rogue-key attack.
Falsifier
What would retire it
Is there a proof of possession?
04 The bound
03 Sequence
One action, as an operating tape
- 01Each signer proves they hold their key.
- 02Signatures aggregate.
- 03A verifier checks the set of keys and one signature.
- 04What is the domain separation string?
04 Load-bearing
The argument, and where a pitch drops it
What the paper is for
The cut
If a chain aggregates BLS votes, ask where the proof of possession happens. If the answer is nowhere, this paper is the objection.
Why it carries weight
If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.
Where it is dropped
A missing proof of possession reopens the rogue-key attack.
What happened after
The cut
Ethereum's later consensus signatures are in this family. The specification, not this paper, sets the domain separation.
Why it carries weight
If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.
Where it is dropped
The paper does not set a validator set.
05 Register
What has to be true
06 Divergence
What happened after the paper
Ethereum's later consensus signatures are in this family. The specification, not this paper, sets the domain separation.
A later client, parameter set, or reward formula is a different object. Cite this paper for the mechanism. Cite a primary release for the network. This desk has not re-run the proof.
07 Pre-mortem
What to check before you use the idea
- 0 of 3 marked on this browser. A mark is a reading note, not a pass, a rating, or a recommendation.
08 Anatomy
The paper, in the order a builder needs
The problem it names
A naive multi-signature either lists every key and every signature, or it can be attacked by a rogue key that cancels someone else's public key.
What the design proposes
- Aggregation is not the same as a threshold scheme.
- A proof of possession is the defence named here.
- Verification is one check, which is why the size matters on a chain.
How the mechanism is specified
- Each signer proves they hold their key.
- Signatures aggregate.
- A verifier checks the set of keys and one signature.
What this page does not treat as proven
Why the desk still reads it
If a chain aggregates BLS votes, ask where the proof of possession happens. If the answer is nowhere, this paper is the objection.
09 Lexicon
Terms, opened into the record
- Rogue key
- A key crafted to cancel another signer's key inside an aggregate.
- Proof of possession
- A proof that the registered key has a known secret.
10 Repository
Every linked record on this page
Underlined words open a page that already exists: a concept, a protocol profile, a failure record, or another paper. If a word is not underlined, this desk does not have a record for it.
This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.
Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.