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LibraryConsensus2016Design paperCorpus record

Bitcoin-NG: A Scalable Blockchain Protocol

Bitcoin-NG. Ittay Eyal, Adem Ercan Gencer, Emin Gün Sirer and Robbert van Renesse.

Separate the rare proof-of-work election from the frequent publication of transactions. Key blocks choose a leader. That leader's microblocks carry the transactions until the next key block.

Bitcoin-NG elects a leader rarely, with proof of work, and lets that leader publish many signed microblocks of transactions before the next election.
Evidence
Primary paper
Re-measured
No
Assumptions
4
Records linked
5

Code

Source, repository, and what is actually hosted

  • arXiv:1510.02037https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.02037
  • The source URL is not a GitHub repository. No code remote is invented.
  • Full text is not mirrored. Public availability is not a licence to copy the file onto this site.
  • Add to a reading list

01 Claim ledger

What the paper is allowed to say

Each row is a sentence already in the study. The status is the same on every row: a model claim, not a live measurement.

  1. Claim 01 · Paper model

    Two kinds of block

    A key block is mined. It chooses the leader and pays them. A microblock is signed by the leader and carries transactions. Only the key block resets who may speak.

  2. Claim 02 · Paper model

    Throughput leaves the puzzle

    The puzzle interval can stay long enough to limit forks. Transactions per second then depend on how fast microblocks can be flooded and checked.

  3. Claim 03 · Paper model

    The next miner polices the last leader

    The paper splits rewards so a leader who misbehaves can be punished by the following key block. That is an incentive, not a vote by users.

  4. Claim 04 · Paper model

    The epoch is a dictatorship

    Inside one leader's window, ordering and censorship are that leader's choice. Short epochs shrink the window. They do not delete it.

02 Three cuts

Observation, model, falsifier

A desk does not stop at the summary. Each claim is cut three ways, using only this study's own assumptions and checks. Nothing here is a new figure.

  1. 01 Two kinds of block

    Observation

    What the study says

    A key block is mined. It chooses the leader and pays them. A microblock is signed by the leader and carries transactions. Only the key block resets who may speak.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The heaviest key-block chain is what nodes follow. Microblocks do not outvote a key block.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    Can that leader publish transactions without a new puzzle?

  2. 02 Throughput leaves the puzzle

    Observation

    What the study says

    The puzzle interval can stay long enough to limit forks. Transactions per second then depend on how fast microblocks can be flooded and checked.

    Model

    What has to hold

    Microblocks propagate faster than the key-block interval. Otherwise the decoupling was pointless.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    Can that leader publish transactions without a new puzzle?

  3. 03 The next miner polices the last leader

    Observation

    What the study says

    The paper splits rewards so a leader who misbehaves can be punished by the following key block. That is an incentive, not a vote by users.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The heaviest key-block chain is what nodes follow. Microblocks do not outvote a key block.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What event elects the leader, and how long do they serve?

  4. 04 The epoch is a dictatorship

    Observation

    What the study says

    Inside one leader's window, ordering and censorship are that leader's choice. Short epochs shrink the window. They do not delete it.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The heaviest key-block chain is what nodes follow. Microblocks do not outvote a key block.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What event elects the leader, and how long do they serve?

03 Sequence

One action, as an operating tape

  1. 01Miners race to find a key block, as in Bitcoin.
  2. 02The winner signs microblocks that reference the key block and carry transactions.
  3. 03Nodes accept microblocks that chain back to the latest key block and carry a valid signature.
  4. 04Another miner finds the next key block. The previous leader's signing power ends.
  5. 05Fees are split between the leader who published the microblock and the miner of the next key block, on the paper's terms.

04 Load-bearing

The argument, and where a pitch drops it

  1. Decoupling is the contribution

    The cut

    The paper's point is that leader election and transaction serialisation are different clocks. Any design that still does both inside one rare block has not used this idea.

    Why it carries weight

    If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.

    Where it is dropped

    This is not Solana, and it is not proof of history. The election is still proof of work.

  2. Leader faults are concentrated

    The cut

    A dishonest leader can stuff or withhold microblocks until they are replaced. The damage is bounded by the epoch length only if the next key block actually arrives.

    Why it carries weight

    If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.

    Where it is dropped

    A corrupt leader's epoch is real damage. The paper bounds it in fees, it does not erase it.

05 Register

What has to be true

  • Cryptography · Not re-measured

    Most hash power follows the protocol, including the rule about which microblocks to build on.

  • Cryptography · Not re-measured

    Microblocks propagate faster than the key-block interval. Otherwise the decoupling was pointless.

  • Cryptography · Not re-measured

    Leaders' keys are the keys that won the puzzle, not a committee glued on later.

  • Cryptography · Not re-measured

    The heaviest key-block chain is what nodes follow. Microblocks do not outvote a key block.

06 Divergence

What happened after the paper

Later high-throughput designs, including Solana's leader schedule, rhyme with the split between election and publication. They are not Bitcoin-NG. Bitcoin itself did not adopt microblocks. Cite the 2016 paper for the split, not for a live network.

A later client, parameter set, or reward formula is a different object. Cite this paper for the mechanism. Cite a primary release for the network. This desk has not re-run the proof.

07 Pre-mortem

What to check before you use the idea

  5. 0 of 4 marked on this browser. A mark is a reading note, not a pass, a rating, or a recommendation.

08 Anatomy

The paper, in the order a builder needs

The problem it names

In Bitcoin, the same puzzle both elects a leader and caps how often transactions can be published. Shortening the block interval raises forks. Bitcoin-NG asks whether those two clocks have to be the same.

What the design proposes

  • Key blocks are mined and decide who may speak.
  • Microblocks are signed by that leader and can be frequent.
  • Rewards are split so the next miner polices the previous leader.

How the mechanism is specified

  • A key block names a public key. Microblocks under that key are valid until another key block appears.
  • Transaction throughput is then limited by bandwidth and verification, not by the puzzle interval.
  • A leader can still censor or reorder inside their epoch. The next key block is the check, not a vote of the users.

What this page does not treat as proven

  • This is not Solana, and it is not proof of history. The election is still proof of work.
  • A corrupt leader's epoch is real damage. The paper bounds it in fees, it does not erase it.
  • The design does not hide transaction contents or stop a miner from preferring its own microblocks.

Why the desk still reads it

Use it when someone claims a chain is faster because blocks are smaller. Ask which event elects the leader, and what that leader can do alone before the next election.

09 Lexicon

Terms, opened into the record

Key block
A mined block that elects the next leader.
Microblock
A signed batch of transactions from that leader, not itself a new election.

10 Repository

Every linked record on this page

Underlined words open a page that already exists: a concept, a protocol profile, a failure record, or another paper. If a word is not underlined, this desk does not have a record for it.

Protocols

This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.

Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.