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Derivation Scheme for MuSig2 Aggregate Keys

BIP 328. Ava Chow.

BIP 328, Derivation Scheme for MuSig2 Aggregate Keys. This document specifies how BIP 32 extended public keys can be constructed from a BIP 327 MuSig2 aggregate public key and how such keys should be used for key derivation.

Status in the source: Complete. A reading of the public specification, not a copy of it and not a certification.

Derivation Scheme for MuSig2 Aggregate Keys is worth reading for the rule it actually adds: This document specifies how BIP 32 extended public keys can be constructed from a BIP 327 MuSig2 aggregate public key and how such keys should be used for key derivation.

The five-minute read

The rule

This document specifies how BIP 32 extended public keys can be constructed from a BIP 327 MuSig2 aggregate public key and how such keys should be used for key derivation.

What was already failing

A signature that does not commit to what the user saw can be replayed into a different spend, a different chain, or a different message.

What the number does not mean

The source marks this complete. That is a statement about the text, not a promise that every wallet or node has shipped it.

What a builder should be able to point at

An implementation either constrains SHA256 or it is a different design.

One action, walked through

  1. Open BIP 328 and read the status line before the examples.
  2. Write down the rule in one sentence. A fair version of that sentence is: This document specifies how BIP 32 extended public keys can be constructed from a BIP 327 MuSig2 aggregate public key and how such keys should be used for key derivation.
  3. Name the object that changes: SHA256.
  4. Ask what an old client, an old contract, or an offline counterparty does. If the document is silent, the silence is part of the design.

The argument, unpacked

What the text is allowed to settle

Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 328 can settle the shape of Derivation Scheme for MuSig2 Aggregate Keys. It cannot settle whether a later client, a later fork, or a later wallet still does this.

What this page will not pretend

There is no benchmark, no adoption number, and no claim that the mechanism is safe outside the assumptions written in the source.

What has to be true

  • You are implementing BIP 328 at the status the text itself states: Complete.
  • The object that has to change is SHA256. A neighbouring document with a similar name is not this one.
  • Wallet support is not the same as consensus validity.

What happened after the paper

The source marks this complete. That is a statement about the text, not a promise that every wallet or node has shipped it. Later documents can narrow, replace, or ignore this one. Cite the number you mean.

What to check before you use the idea

  • What is covered by the signed bytes in Derivation Scheme for MuSig2 Aggregate Keys?
  • Can the same signature be replayed on another chain, account, or message?
  • Which primitive does the text require: SHA256?

Terms

BIP 328
The public text titled Derivation Scheme for MuSig2 Aggregate Keys.
Complete
The document's own label for how finished the text is. It is not a market fact.

The problem the paper names

A signature that does not commit to what the user saw can be replayed into a different spend, a different chain, or a different message.

What the design proposes

  • This document specifies how BIP 32 extended public keys can be constructed from a BIP 327 MuSig2 aggregate public key and how such keys should be used for key derivation.
  • Multiple signers can create a single aggregate public key with MuSig2 that is indistinguishable from a random public key.
  • The cosigners need a method for generating additional aggregate pubkeys to follow the best practice of using a new address for every payment.

How the mechanism is specified

  • Taken from the specification, the next constraint is: Multiple signers can create a single aggregate public key with MuSig2 that is indistinguishable from a random public key.
  • Locate SHA256 in BIP 328 and apply it to one transaction or call.
  • Then check the failure the class of rule always has: a node that did not upgrade, a reverted call, a replayed signature, or a peer that does not speak the message.

What this page does not treat as proven

  • A signature scheme is not a privacy system. It hides the signer only if the protocol says so.
  • Wallet support is not the same as consensus validity.
  • The source marks this complete. That is a statement about the text, not a promise that every wallet or node has shipped it.

Why a venture studio still reads it

Use BIP 328 when a pitch says 'Derivation Scheme for MuSig2 Aggregate Keys' without saying whether the rule is consensus, policy, or an interface. The number is the citation. The pitch is not.

This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.

Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.