Skip to content
Blockchain LabBlockchain LabTHE VENTURE STUDIO

LibraryPrivacy2016Design paperCorpus record

BBS+ Signatures and Selective Disclosure

BBS signatures. Jan Camenisch, Manu Drijvers and Anja Lehmann.

A BBS-family signature can be proved in zero knowledge so a holder reveals only some messages and produces an unlinkable presentation.

A reading of the public document. Not a copy of it, and not a claim about a later network that reused the name.

A selective-disclosure pitch should say which signature, which fields are hidden, and whether two presentations can be tied together.
Evidence
Primary paper
Re-measured
No
Assumptions
3
Records linked
2

Code

Source, repository, and what is actually hosted

  • ePrint 2016/663https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/663
  • The source URL is not a GitHub repository. No code remote is invented.
  • Full text is not mirrored. Public availability is not a licence to copy the file onto this site.
  • Add to a reading list

01 Claim ledger

What the paper is allowed to say

Each row is a sentence already in the study. The status is the same on every row: a model claim, not a live measurement.

  1. Claim 01 · Paper model

    The defect

    A signed credential that must be shown in full teaches the verifier every field, and links every presentation to the same signature.

  2. Claim 02 · Paper model

    The rule

    A BBS-family signature can be proved in zero knowledge so a holder reveals only some messages and produces an unlinkable presentation.

  3. Claim 03 · Paper model

    How it is put together

    The issuer signs a vector of messages. The holder proves knowledge of a signature on a subset. Unlinkability is a goal of the proof, not of the issuer's log.

  4. Claim 04 · Paper model

    Where the claim stops

    The paper's scheme is not every library that says BBS.

02 Three cuts

Observation, model, falsifier

A desk does not stop at the summary. Each claim is cut three ways, using only this study's own assumptions and checks. Nothing here is a new figure.

  1. 01 The defect

    Observation

    What the study says

    A signed credential that must be shown in full teaches the verifier every field, and links every presentation to the same signature.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The paper's scheme is not every library that says BBS.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    Which messages are revealed?

  2. 02 The rule

    Observation

    What the study says

    A BBS-family signature can be proved in zero knowledge so a holder reveals only some messages and produces an unlinkable presentation.

    Model

    What has to hold

    Revocation and issuer correlation are extra.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    Which messages are revealed?

  3. 03 How it is put together

    Observation

    What the study says

    The issuer signs a vector of messages. The holder proves knowledge of a signature on a subset. Unlinkability is a goal of the proof, not of the issuer's log.

    Model

    What has to hold

    Revocation and issuer correlation are extra.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    Which messages are revealed?

  4. 04 Where the claim stops

    Observation

    What the study says

    The paper's scheme is not every library that says BBS.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The paper's scheme is not every library that says BBS.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    Where is revocation checked?

03 Sequence

One action, as an operating tape

  1. 01The issuer signs the attributes.
  2. 02The holder generates a proof that reveals the attributes they chose.
  3. 03The verifier checks the proof against the issuer's public key.
  4. 04Which messages are revealed?

04 Load-bearing

The argument, and where a pitch drops it

  1. Why it is still on the desk

    The cut

    A selective-disclosure pitch should say which signature, which fields are hidden, and whether two presentations can be tied together.

    Why it carries weight

    If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.

    Where it is dropped

    A later client, parameter or reward formula is a different object from this paragraph.

  2. After the text

    The cut

    W3C and DIF profiles later pointed at BBS. The 2016 paper is the signature, not the product.

    Why it carries weight

    If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.

    Where it is dropped

    The paper's scheme is not every library that says BBS.

05 Register

What has to be true

  • Model · Not re-measured

    The paper's scheme is not every library that says BBS.

  • Model · Not re-measured

    Revocation and issuer correlation are extra.

  • Model · Not re-measured

    It does not put the attributes on a chain.

06 Divergence

What happened after the paper

W3C and DIF profiles later pointed at BBS. The 2016 paper is the signature, not the product.

A later client, parameter set, or reward formula is a different object. Cite this paper for the mechanism. Cite a primary release for the network. This desk has not re-run the proof.

07 Pre-mortem

What to check before you use the idea

  4. 0 of 3 marked on this browser. A mark is a reading note, not a pass, a rating, or a recommendation.

08 Anatomy

The paper, in the order a builder needs

The problem it names

A signed credential that must be shown in full teaches the verifier every field, and links every presentation to the same signature.

What the design proposes

  • The issuer signs a vector of messages.
  • The holder proves knowledge of a signature on a subset.
  • Unlinkability is a goal of the proof, not of the issuer's log.

How the mechanism is specified

  • The issuer signs the attributes.
  • The holder generates a proof that reveals the attributes they chose.
  • The verifier checks the proof against the issuer's public key.

What this page does not treat as proven

  • The paper's scheme is not every library that says BBS.
  • Revocation and issuer correlation are extra.
  • It does not put the attributes on a chain.

Why the desk still reads it

A selective-disclosure pitch should say which signature, which fields are hidden, and whether two presentations can be tied together.

09 Lexicon

Terms, opened into the record

Selective disclosure
Showing some signed fields and withholding the rest.
Unlinkable presentation
A proof that does not identify the holder across uses.

10 Repository

Every linked record on this page

Underlined words open a page that already exists: a concept, a protocol profile, a failure record, or another paper. If a word is not underlined, this desk does not have a record for it.

This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.

Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.