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LibraryData and agents2018Design paperCorpus record

Augur: a Decentralized Oracle and Prediction Market Platform

Augur. Jack Peterson, Joseph Krug, Micah Zoltu, Austin K. Williams, Stephanie Alexander.

The Augur paper: prediction markets whose outcomes are reported by token holders, with a dispute ladder that can escalate a contested result. It is both a market design and an oracle design. The historic library already holds Gnosis. Augur is the other canonical public prediction-market paper and was not in that set.

Augur's paper specifies a prediction market whose outcomes are reported by token holders, with a dispute ladder that can escalate a lie toward a fork of the market itself.
Evidence
Primary paper
Re-measured
No
Assumptions
4
Records linked
5

Code

Source, repository, and what is actually hosted

  • Augur white paperhttps://augur.net/whitepaper.pdf
  • The source URL is not a GitHub repository. No code remote is invented.
  • Full text is not mirrored. Public availability is not a licence to copy the file onto this site.
  • Add to a reading list

01 Claim ledger

What the paper is allowed to say

Each row is a sentence already in the study. The status is the same on every row: a model claim, not a live measurement.

  1. Claim 01 · Paper model

    A prediction market needs a referee

    The contract can hold the stakes. It cannot watch the world and decide who won. Augur's referee is a reporting and dispute process, not a named person.

  2. Claim 02 · Paper model

    Reporting is a bonded claim

    A reporter stakes on an outcome. If nobody disputes, that outcome stands and the market resolves. The bond is the cost of a casual lie.

  3. Claim 03 · Paper model

    Disputes escalate

    A challenger posts a larger bond. Rounds continue until the stake at risk is large, up to a fork in the paper's full design. The ladder is how a cheap market and a high-stakes market share one system.

  4. Claim 04 · Paper model

    A fork is the nuclear step

    Token holders split into universes, one per contested outcome. The market the paper believes in is the universe people choose to keep using. That is a social finality, and the paper says so.

  5. Claim 05 · Paper model

    Markets can be about anything reportable

    The paper's neutrality about subject matter is a design choice with legal and ethical consequences. It is not a technical requirement of the dispute ladder.

02 Three cuts

Observation, model, falsifier

A desk does not stop at the summary. Each claim is cut three ways, using only this study's own assumptions and checks. Nothing here is a new figure.

  1. 01 A prediction market needs a referee

    Observation

    What the study says

    The contract can hold the stakes. It cannot watch the world and decide who won. Augur's referee is a reporting and dispute process, not a named person.

    Model

    What has to hold

    Some set of holders will dispute a false report before the window ends.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What is the dispute window relative to how long a lie would be profitable?

  2. 02 Reporting is a bonded claim

    Observation

    What the study says

    A reporter stakes on an outcome. If nobody disputes, that outcome stands and the market resolves. The bond is the cost of a casual lie.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The question is specified tightly enough that honest reporters agree. Ambiguity forks honest people.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    Is the question unambiguous on the day it resolves, not only on the day it was written?

  3. 03 Disputes escalate

    Observation

    What the study says

    A challenger posts a larger bond. Rounds continue until the stake at risk is large, up to a fork in the paper's full design. The ladder is how a cheap market and a high-stakes market share one system.

    Model

    What has to hold

    The cost of a fork is real to the attacker and survivable for the system.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    Who makes the first report, and how large is their bond?

  4. 04 A fork is the nuclear step

    Observation

    What the study says

    Token holders split into universes, one per contested outcome. The market the paper believes in is the universe people choose to keep using. That is a social finality, and the paper says so.

    Model

    What has to hold

    Some set of holders will dispute a false report before the window ends.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    Does this market actually fork a valuable token, or does it stop at an admin?

  5. 05 Markets can be about anything reportable

    Observation

    What the study says

    The paper's neutrality about subject matter is a design choice with legal and ethical consequences. It is not a technical requirement of the dispute ladder.

    Model

    What has to hold

    Some set of holders will dispute a false report before the window ends.

    Falsifier

    What would retire it

    What is the dispute window relative to how long a lie would be profitable?

03 Sequence

One action, as an operating tape

  1. 01A market is created with a question, an end time, and a designated reporter.
  2. 02Traders buy and sell shares in outcomes. The price is the market's probability only if the resolution process is trusted.
  3. 03After the end time, the reporter submits an outcome with a bond.
  4. 04During the dispute window, anyone can challenge with a higher bond. Further rounds raise the amount.
  5. 05If the dispute reaches a fork, token holders migrate to the universe they believe, and the market resolves in the universe that retains participation.

04 Load-bearing

The argument, and where a pitch drops it

  1. The price is only as good as the referee

    The cut

    A clean automated market maker on top of a corruptible resolution is a clean market for a crooked question. Augur's contribution is to spend its design budget on resolution. A study that explains the trading curve and skips the fork has skipped the paper.

    Why it carries weight

    If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.

    Where it is dropped

    A prediction market can be illegal to offer in a given jurisdiction. The paper is not legal advice and this page is not an invitation to list markets.

  2. Forks are credible only if the token matters

    The cut

    Migrating to a universe is a punishment if the token and the future fee stream have value. If they do not, a wealthy liar can outlast the ladder. The security is circular in the way many cryptoeconomic systems are, and it should be described as circular rather than as solved.

    Why it carries weight

    If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.

    Where it is dropped

    Thin dispute markets fail closed or fail captured. The ladder only helps if someone climbs it.

  3. Designated reporters are a convenience and a target

    The cut

    They make ordinary markets resolve quickly. They also mean the first report is one party's job. The dispute window is what keeps that from being the whole trust model. A market with a reporter and no realistic disputers is a centralised call in a decentralised costume.

    Why it carries weight

    If this cut is skipped, the paper's name is being used without the mechanism that makes the name mean anything.

    Where it is dropped

    A prediction market can be illegal to offer in a given jurisdiction. The paper is not legal advice and this page is not an invitation to list markets.

05 Register

What has to be true

  • Model · Not re-measured

    Some set of holders will dispute a false report before the window ends.

  • Adversary · Not re-measured

    The question is specified tightly enough that honest reporters agree. Ambiguity forks honest people.

  • Model · Not re-measured

    The cost of a fork is real to the attacker and survivable for the system.

  • Model · Not re-measured

    Traders understand that a share pays out only after this process, not when the newspaper headline appears.

06 Divergence

What happened after the paper

Augur launched on Ethereum, saw thin liquidity, and later revised the token and the market design. The dispute ladder and the fork remain the idea worth teaching. A live prediction market that uses a committee or a single resolver is a different product and should not borrow Augur's security paragraph.

A later client, parameter set, or reward formula is a different object. Cite this paper for the mechanism. Cite a primary release for the network. This desk has not re-run the proof.

07 Pre-mortem

What to check before you use the idea

  1. 0 of 4 marked on this browser. A mark is a reading note, not a pass, a rating, or a recommendation.

08 Anatomy

The paper, in the order a builder needs

The problem it names

A prediction market is only as honest as the oracle that says what happened. If a single reporter can settle the market, the market prices the reporter. Augur's paper spreads reporting across holders and makes a false report contestable by people who post a bond.

What the design proposes

  • Markets define an outcome space and a resolution time.
  • Reporters stake on an outcome. Disputers can escalate by staking more, up a ladder the paper specifies.
  • Forking the reporting universe is the final backstop the paper is willing to name.

How the mechanism is specified

  • The economic claim is that a liar must outbid everyone who prefers a true resolution, at each rung.
  • Market prices are then a public estimate conditional on that oracle actually working.
  • A forked universe is a social and technical event. The paper treats it as part of security, not as an embarrassment.

What this page does not treat as proven

  • A prediction market can be illegal to offer in a given jurisdiction. The paper is not legal advice and this page is not an invitation to list markets.
  • Thin dispute markets fail closed or fail captured. The ladder only helps if someone climbs it.
  • Later Augur versions changed mechanics. Cite the version.

Why the desk still reads it

The pattern we care about is escalatable truth: a reported fact that a named bond can challenge, with a last resort that is explicit. That pattern shows up in oracles, in governance, and in agent mandates. Augur writes it down.

09 Lexicon

Terms, opened into the record

Designated reporter
The party expected to submit the first bonded outcome after the market ends.
Dispute round
A challenge that raises the bond and reopens the outcome.
Fork
A split of the token into universes, one per contested outcome, used when the ladder reaches the top.
Universe
The branch of the system that holders choose to keep using after a fork. Resolution follows that choice.

10 Repository

Every linked record on this page

Underlined words open a page that already exists: a concept, a protocol profile, a failure record, or another paper. If a word is not underlined, this desk does not have a record for it.

This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.

Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.